Williams v. Illinois
Confrontation Clause: When Forensic Reports Are Testimonial Remains Unclear
By Heather Whitney – Edited by Charlie Stiernberg
Williams v. Illinois, No. 10-8505, 2012 WL 2202981 (U.S. June 18, 2012)
Slip opinion
In a fractured decision, the Supreme Court held that an expert witness could testify about a DNA test not entered into evidence and performed by a non-testifying analyst without violating the Confrontation Clause. However, with five Justices expressly rejecting the entirety of the plurality’s analysis, no majority agreed on the reasoning underlying the decision. Thus, lower courts continue to lack clear guidance as to when a forensic report is testimonal for Confrontation Clause purposes and, in cases where a forensic report is considered testimonial, which and how many analysts must testify.
Facts and Procedural History:
On February 10, 2000, L.J., a woman in Chicago, was walking home from work when she was forced into a car, robbed, and raped. After her attacker released her, she went to the hospital where doctors took a vaginal swab for a rape kit. A police detective then took the kit, labeled it, and sent it under seal to the Illinois State Police lab. On February 15, 2000, a forensic scientist at the lab received the sealed kit and proceeded to conduct a test that confirmed the presence of semen on the swab. The scientist then resealed the kit and placed it in an evidence freezer. The record shows that on November 28, 2000 the police lab then sent the kit to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory for DNA analysis. On April 3, 2001, Cellmark sent a report back to the Illinois State Police lab that was labeled as containing the DNA profile of the man whose semen was found on the vaginal swab.
The report, while signed by two reviewers, was not officially certified for its accuracy. After Cellmark returned the report, Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist, conducted a search to determine whether the DNA profile reported by Cellmark matched any of the entries in the state DNA database. She found a match to petitioner based on blood taken from him after an arrest on unrelated charges. After L.J. identified petitioner in a lineup on April 17, 2001, he was indicted for, inter alia, aggravated criminal sexual assault. Petitioner waived his right to a jury and a bench trial commenced.
At the bench trial, the State called Sandra Lambatos as an expert witness. During her testimony, Lambatos was asked and answered three contested questions:
First, whether there was “a computer match generated [between] the male DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs . . . [and the] male DNA profile [stored in the state DNA database]” (emphasis added). Because Lambatos had seen a match between the DNA report she received from Cellmark and petitioner’s DNA found in the database, she said yes.
Second, Lambatos was asked whether she independently “compare[d] the semen that had been identified... from the vaginal swabs... to that male DNA profile [found in the database] that [was from] the blood of [petitioner]” (emphasis added). Here again Lambatos answered in the affirmative.
Finally, the prosecutor asked Lambatos whether, as an expert, it was her opinion that the DNA derived from the semen taken from the vaginal swab was “a match” to petitioner. Again, Lambatos said yes.
Throughout Lambatos’s testimony, the defense objected for lack of foundation and, at the end of her testimony, moved, based on petitioner’s Confrontation Clause rights, to exclude it insofar as she discussed the testing conducted by Cellmark. The prosecution responded that petitioner’s Confrontation Clause rights were satisfied, as Lambatos was testifying that there was a match between the DNA profile Cellmark produced and the DNA profile in the state database. The prosecution further argued that while it was true that Lambatos’s testimony disclosed that the Cellmark report she received was derived from semen found on the vaginal swab, that was “basis evidence.” And, per Illinois Rule of Evidence 703, an expert can disclose the facts on which her opinion is based, even if she is not competent to testify as to those underlying facts.
The trial judge agreed and later found petitioner guilty. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no violation of petitioner’s confrontation rights because the report was not offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter it asserted. Instead, according to the Court of Appeals, the report was merely offered to provide a basis for Lambatos’s opinion. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, again finding that Lambatos’s reference to the report was done for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for her expert opinion and not for the truth the report asserted (namely, that the DNA profile in the report was derived from the semen taken from L.J.’s vaginal swab). The Supreme Court affirmed.
Confrontation Clause Background:
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Modern Confrontation Clause doctrine began with the 2004 Crawford v. Washington decision. 541 U.S. 36. There, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the prosecution from admitting “testimonial statements of a witness who [does] not appear at trial unless he [is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant . . . had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 53–54. While choosing not to fully define “testimonial,” the Court in Crawford found that testimony is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” and that the “core class” of testimonial evidence includes materials the declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. Id. at 51. Later Courts interpreted this to be an objective primary purpose test.
In both Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), the Court began grappling with the question of how its new primary purpose rule would apply to forensic reports and statements written by laboratory technicians; that is, whether such reports (1) count as “testimonial,” and if so, (2) who exactly would the prosecution need to call as a witness when introducing those reports.
In Melendez-Diaz, the prosecution introduced sworn “certificates of analysis” from a state lab analyst stating that the substance seized from the defendant was cocaine. The certificates were submitted as evidence of what they asserted (that is, that the substance was cocaine) and they were submitted without calling that analyst to testify. In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that the certificates were testimonial evidence and, accordingly, held that their admission violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.
In Bullcoming, the prosecution similarly attempted to enter a signed and certified lab report, this time showing that a defendant’s blood-alcohol levels were above legal limits. Unlike in Melendez-Diaz, where no analyst was called, the state did call an analyst to testify to the certification. However, instead of calling the analyst who actually conducted and certified the test, the prosecution called a different analyst who, while familiar with the relevant methods and procedures, had neither participated in nor certified the testing of Bullcoming’s particular sample. In a fractured 5-4 decision, the Court found that, like in Melendez-Diaz, the analyst’s certification was “created specifically to serve as evidence in a criminal proceeding” and, as such, was testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709. The Court also found that a surrogate witness (namely, the analyst who did not actually perform the specific testing) did not satisfy the defendant’s confrontation rights. However, while there were five Justices for the judgment, Justice Sotomayor’s partial concurrence made clear that there was no majority for how to determine whether a particular statement counts as testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. Justice Sotomayor also explicitly noted that the Bullcoming opinion did not resolve the problem of when a surrogate witness testifies about a report without admitting the report into evidence—the precise question the Court dealt with in Williams v. Illinois.
Reasoning of the Court
Plurality Opinion
Justice Alito, writing for a plurality of the Court (he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer), held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated when Lambatos referenced the out-of-court report on which her opinion was based without testifying to its truth. Justice Alito gave two independent bases for his conclusion:
- Out-of-court statements referenced by an expert witness solely for the purpose of explaining the basis for that expert’s opinion are not offered for their truth and, as such, do not trigger the Confrontation Clause.
- The report was not testimonial. Thus, even if the report had been admitted into evidence, there would have been no Confrontation Clause violation.
- Any testing conducted after a suspect has been identified is still likely to trigger the Confrontation Clause. Given the logic behind this targeting rationale, it seems confrontation rights should be triggered regardless of whether the originally targeted individual is the one later indicted by the forensic report or not.
- If a defendant can show a good reason to doubt the reliability of the testing, or if it looks like the prosecution is attempting to evade a formalized report process in bad faith, Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas would likely find the Confrontation Clause triggered. The difficulty, however, is determining what counts as “bad faith” for Justice Thomas or sufficiently unreliable for Justice Breyer, given that neither Justice found those conditions met here.
- While Justice Alito said otherwise, his opinion appears to make the identity of the fact-finder relevant. That said, it seems unlikely that anyone in the plurality would have held differently if this had been a jury case.
- If the report is sufficiently “formal” or “solemn,” Justice Thomas may once again join with the dissent and find the report a testimonial.
- And finally, we can expect Justice Sotomayor to be more Confrontation Clause-friendly than her concurrence in Bullcoming may have suggested.